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UMAN BEINGS TEND TO FORM GROUPS for cooperative purposes; this
tendency seems to be instinctive. Many anthropologists and so-
ciologists and political philosophers speak of homo sapiens as a "social
animal" that normally hunts and lives in groups or "packs."' Some
speak of these tendencies as "shared commitment" for the achieve-
ment of shared ends or purposes, which in turn involves a need for
rules to hold the group together (e.g., its "legal principles").2 Organ-
ization of groups usually is informal, loose and "unincorporated" at
first, and then increasingly formal, tight, and corporate as the society
becomes more sophisticated.
Western civilization has been (and is) characterized by voluntary
associations of people, from the earliest warrior bands and "churches"
to towns and universities and guilds, etc.3 Corporations, as vehicles
for such associations, did not exist until relatively recently, and asso-
ciations were (and very many still are) unincorporated. 4 Unincorpor-
ated associations as a form of organization have been losing ground
to the corporation, but are far from obsolete.5
Definitions
Nonprofit is a word of complex nature requiring a lengthy an-
alysis for definition.5a It requires full scale discussion in order to
make clear what it means. In general, "nonprofit organizations are
those that are not intended to, and do not, produce monetary gain
for their members or managers, except as reasonable salaries paid
for services as employees, actually rendered to the organizations. 'Sb
*Distinguished Prof. of Law, Cleveland State University
[Note: This is an advance publication of a chapter written for the writer's forthcoming
Third Edition of his book, OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS & ASSOCIA-
TIONS (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 2d ed. dated 1965)]
1 L. L. FULLER, Two Principles of Human Association, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
(Pennock and Chapman, eds. 1969).
2 Id. Fuller suggests a series of eight "laws" governing the interrelations of the two
aspects ("principles") of human "associations".
3 J. W. CHAPMAN, Voluntary Association and the Political Theory of Pluralism, in
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS 87 (Pennock and Chapman, eds. 1969).
4 See generally, McNEILL, THE RISE OF THE WEST. A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COM-
MUNITY (1963) ; TREvoR-RoPEt, THE RISE OF CHRIS7IAN EUROPE (1965).
5 See, 1 OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW, chs. 1, 2, 4. (supp. 1965); WRIGHTINGTON,
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND BUSINESS TRUSTS 285 (1923); FLEXNER & BAILEY,
FUNDS AND FOUNDATIONS (1952); Wynn, Charitable Organizations, 92 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 762-6 (1953) ; RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1962); FORD, UNINCORPOR-
ATED NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATIONs: THEIR PROPERTY AND THEIR LIABILITY (1959) ; LLOYD,
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS (1938) ; JOSLING AND LIONEL, LAW OF CLUBS (1964);
R. NEEDHAME, ED., PRIVATE CLUBS--LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS (1969).
5a See, OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, ch. I (2d
ed. 1965).
5b Oleck, Non-Profit Types, Uses, and Abuses, 1970, 19 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 207, 211
(1970), citing cases.
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Nonprofit organizations may be truly charitable (as an orphan
asylum) or merely not intended for distribution of profits as divi-
dends to investors (as a golf club). The term sodality has been sug-
gested as a replacement for the term "nonprofit, unincorporated as-
sociation."50
Association is a word of vague meaning that indicates a group of
persons who have joined together for a certain object or purposes. 6
It resembles a partnership, but must be distinguished from partner-
ship.
A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on
as co-owners a "business for profit.17 If an organization's purpose is
not profit-making, the organization is not a partnership.8 The typical
unincorporated non-profit organization such as informally organized
sports clubs,9 or civic societies,10 political committees," religious
communes, 12 fraternal orders,13 and patriotic societies,14 are not
partnerships.
Labor unions, generally speaking, are not partnerships, and
neither are trade associations, because they are not intended to
obtain profits for the organization as an organization, even though
they are intended to obtain profits for their members.15 The same is
true of associations of organizations for maintaining a service used
by the members. 16
e CONARD, KNAUSS, & SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION: CASES ON EMPLOYMENT,
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, CORPORATIONS 5 (1972).
6 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 156 (4th ed. 1951). And see, FoRo UNINCORPORATED NON-
PROFIT ASSOCIATIONS 50-147 (1959) ; WESTER, LAW Or ASSOCIATIONS, ch. 1 (1971).
7 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 6 (1); CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 524-4 (2d ed. 1952).
8 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (6 U. L. A. 1969) § 6, official comment; and see, Note,
Unincorporated -Associations in New England, 37 BOSTON U. L. REV. 336 (1957).
9 Florio v. State ex. rel. Epperson, 119 S. 2d 305, 80 A. L. R. 2d 1117 (Fla. App. 1960);
held not able to be treated as a partnership for lawsuit purposes.
10 Cousin v. Taylor, 115 Ore. 472, 239 P. 96 (1925), group to try to obtain better tele-
phone rates for users.
11 Hale v. Hirsch, 205 A. D. 308, 199 N. Y. S. 514 (1923) ; Fennel v. Hauser, 141 Ore.
71, 14 P. 2d 998 (1932). But cf., a commission appointed by governor to support a
state entry at an exposition, Robbins Co. v. Cook, 42 S. D. 136, N. W. 445,
7 A. L. R. 218 (1919). And, political committee members held liable for purchase by
chairman, Vader v. Ballou, 151 Wis. 577, 139 N. W. 413, 7 A. L. R. 216 (1913).
See Annots., 61 A. L. R. 241 (1929) and 126 A. L. R. 114 (1940).
12 Teed v. Parsons, 202 Ill. 455, 66 N. E. 1044 (1903) ; but cf. Thurmond v. Cedar
Spring Baptist Church, 110 Ga. 816, 36 S. E. 221 (1900) ; Forsberg v. Zehm, 150
Va. 756, 143 S. E. 284 (1928) ; Comment, 15 VA. L. REv. 98 (1928).
13 Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Cooper, 62 Calif. App. 2d 653, 145 P. 2d 722 (1943)
State v. Sunbeam Rebekah Lodge, 169 Ore. 253, 127 P. 2d 726 (1942).
14 Ostrom v. Greene, 161 N. Y. 353, 55 N. E. 919 (1900).
15 Labor unions: Mooney v. Bartenders' Union Local No. 284, 302 P. 2d 866 (Cal. App.
1956), reeld on other grounds, 48 Cal. 2d 841, 313 P. 2d 857 (1957) ; People v.
Herbert, 162 Misc. 817, 295 N.Y.S. 251 (1937); but cf. State v. Ritholz, 257 Minn.
201, 100 N. W. 2d 722 (1960) ; and cf. Teamsters Local 516 v. Santa Fe Packing, 300
P. 2d 660 (Okla. 1956). Trade associations: Blair v. Southern Clay Mfg. Co., 173
Tenn. 571, 121 S. W. 2d 570 (1938) ; Marshalltown Mutual Plate Glass Ins. Ass'n
v. Bendlage, 195 Iowa 1200, 193 N. W. 448 (1922).
1s E.g., a common sewage system, Kittrell v. Angelo, 170 Ark. 982, 282 S. W. 363 (1926).
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Joint venture members are not partners, if the venture is one not
aimed at profit for the group as such.17 A joint venture is a business
enterprise undertaken by several persons as a single ("one-shot")
project for profit, 18 even if the project may take years to complete.
And, similarly, promoters of a corporation are not "partners" because
their profits are to be obtained through the corporation rather than
directly from their joint action. 19
Cooperatives, charitable trusts, professional associations, condominiums,
and other special types of organizations may be incorporated or un-
incorporated.
Of course the fact that a nonprofit organization makes money
in some of its activities does not mean that the organization must
be treated as a business for profit. Thus, a nonprofit organization
may make money by selling beer, but devote the money to the organ-
ization's ultimate purpose, in which case the "unrelated business
activity" is to be treated as a business operation (e.g., is taxable, for
example), but the organization's overall nonprofit status continues.20
Nonprofit Associations, In General
Statutory provisions for unincorporated associations are frag-
mentary and inadequate in almost all of the states. In most cases
they consist of short sections scattered through the state's code. Thus,
there usually is a provision for agricultural associations in one place,
one for firemen's associations in another, one for fraternal associa-
tions in still another part of the state's code, and so on.
Incomplete and sketchy provisions of this kind are found in the
statutes of such states as California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, New
York and Ohio. In some states there are hardly any provisions for
unincorporated associations.
New Jersey's statute for Unincorporated Organizations21 is an ex-
ample of a relatively integrated provision. It consists of a few short
sections, and deals with lawsuits involving such organizations. Its
primary purpose is to allow lawsuits to be brought by or against an
unincorporated association in its recognized name, if it has one. It
allows service of legal process on the president or other officer,
agent or person in charge of its business, and execution of judgment
against its assets. But it also allows suit and judgment against any
members who are personally liable, if the organization does not
17 Sappenfield v. Mead, 338 Il1. App. 236, 87 N. E. 2d 220 (1949), property owners
joined together to enforce zoning rules.
18 BLACK'S LAW DxcrIONARY 73 (4th ed. 1951).
9ID McEachin v. Kingman, 64- Ga. App. 104, 12 S. E. 2d 212 (1940) ; Schuster v. Largman,
308 Pa. 520, 162 A. 305 (1932); but cf. Hagan v Asa G. Candler, Inc., 189 Ga. 250,
5 S. E. 2d 739, 126 A. L. R_ 108 (1939).
20 Curtin v. Albion Brown's Post 590--Am. Legion, 74 I1. App. 144, 219 N. E. 2d 386
(1966) ; Bromberg, Tax Influences on Law of Business Associations, 16 BAYLOR L.
REV. 527 (1964).
21 N. J. STAT. ANwo., tit. 2A, c. 64 (19S2).
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satisfy a judgment against it, or even without suit against the asso-
ciation as an organization. 22
The New Jersey statute, at its end, expressly exempts from its
application, in regard to lawsuits of equitable nature, charitable and
fraternal organizations. 2 This is not explained.
The New Jersey statutes also contain a small volume, in the set,
dealing with various special types of organizations and certain of their
problems.24 This however, mixes corporate and unincorporated mat-
ters in confusing style.
California's bulky statutes contain bits and pieces about unin-
corporated associations, scattered through volumes and chapters and
sections dealing with corporations, probate, finance, military matters,
etc.25
New York's short statute on unincorporated associations, like
New Jersey's consists mainly of a few provisions concerning lawsuit
procedures by or against associations, service of process, and the
like.26
Statutes of most states, such as they are, usually are much like
those of California, New Jersey, or New York.
It is easy to see, from the examples of these statutes, how un-
desirable the unincorporated form of organization usually is to its
members. Use of this form of organization today usually results from
sheer ignorance of the possible degree of personal liability of its
members.
Either natural persons or corporations may be members of un-
incorporated associations. 27 The most familiar type of association of
corporations is the trade association.
Modern associations usually are organized on roughly the fol-
lowing basis:
1. Articles of Association. This is an agreement (contract) among
the original members, to which new members also agree. It sets up
the general plan of organization, the purposes to be accomplished,
and the method of operation.
In a few states, where statutes exist as to this matter, they direct
merely that articles of association shall provide:
a. That the death or departure of a member shall not work a
dissolution of the association.
22 Id.
23 Id., § 64-6.
24 N. J. STAT. ANNO., tits. 15-16, Corps. & Ass'ns. Not For Profit (1939).
25 See, ANN. CALIF. CODE, Gen. Index (West 1969).
26 N. Y. GEN. Ass'Ns L., and N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS. ch. 29 (McKinney, supp. 1971-72).
27 See, 4 OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § 1795 (1965 supp. ed); WEBSTER, LAW Or
AssocIATrONS (1971) which deals with trade associations in detail.
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b. That the board of directors or trustees shall consist of (3) (5)
members, who shall have the sole management of association
affairs.
c. Any other management. of association affairs not inconsistent
with law. 28
2. Constitution. This is the basic internal law of the organization,
equivalent to a national or a state constitution. Sometimes it is im-
plicit in the articles of association.
3. Bylaws. This is the detailed set of internal laws covering inter-
nal procedures and regulations. It is equivalent to the specific statutes
of a state, as contrasted with the general provisions of a constitution.
Sometimes the bylaws are in the constitution or even in the articles
of association.
4. Management is carried on by an elected board of directors
or trustees, who often are also the officers of the association.
5. Membership is evidenced by certificates of membership (or
membership cards), which sometimes are transferable.
6. Continuity of existence in the event of the death, resignation
or expulsion of any member usually is provided by the articles of
association.
7. Property-holding power is vested in the board of directors or
trustees.
8. Income tax exemption applies to the organization if its activi-
ties as a whole are not for the profit of its members.
2 9
Because a nonprofit association is neither a partnership nor a
corporation, it has a very indefinite character. Except insofar as
statutes in a few states provided, it was not viewed as a legal entity
in the past, and still is not in some respects, while it is in others. It
suffers constant difficulties in acquiring, holding, and passing title
to property, in making contracts, and in bringing or defending legal
actions.
In recent years, governmental authorities have applied regula-
tory administration to many unincorporated as well as incorporated
group activities. As a result, few advantages remain to the modern
association. It is a desirable form of organization only for very special
purposes.
25 E.g., N. Y. G~n. Ass'Ns L., Art. 1 (McKinney 1942). See Chaffee, The Internal
Affairs of Associations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 1022 (1930); Douglas, The Right of
Association, 63 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1361 (1963).
29 Consumer-Farmer Milk Coop., Inc. v. Commissioner, 186 F. 2d 68 (2d Cir. 1950);
Parker v. Commissioner, 365 F. 2d 792, 796 (8th Cir. 1966); RABKIN & JOHNSON,
FEDERAL INCOME, GlF-r & ESTATE TAXATION § 2.10-2.12 (rev. to date). See, Lake Forest
Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T. C. 510, 538 (1961). For examples, see infra, cases cited
at note 66a.
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What Organizations Should Use Association Form?
Small local organizations, such as the following types, are the
kinds of organizations that best can use unincorporated association
form:
1. Local clubs. Social and sport groups of a local or neighborhood
character often find the formalities of incorporation undesirable. But
it should be understood by them that informal oral agreements of
association are full of uncertainties. Formal articles of association
(e.g., a constitution and bylaws) are the minimum provisions to avoid
both misunderstanding and possible full personal liability.
2. Local societies. Musical, literary, or religious societies may take
the unincorporated association form, subject to the dangers pointed
out in item 1, above.
3. Fraternal benefit societies. These must use written articles of
association. Their activities that have the character of insurance or
indemnity are strictly subject to regulation by state insurance and
public welfare statutes and authorities.
4. Political clubs and cammittees. These should use written articles
of association. They are subject in all states to special statutes. They
are usually required to have the approval of county or state party
headquarters if their activities or names are party-organizational.
Propaganda organizations may have to employ unincorporated form, as
in the case of the organization to favor liberal homosexual laws,
which was refused a chapter of incorporation because its purpose was
(as yet) illegal.2 9 a
5. Labor unions. This is by far the most important group of unin-
corporated associations. Labor unions, particularly, often find it
preferable not to incorporate.
The vagueness of organizational liability is here an advantage.
Activities of these associations sometimes fall in a liability twilight
zone, and the association form further obscures both personal liabil-
ity and that of the group. Such legislation as the Taft-Hartley Act
(Labor Management Act of 1947) failed to clarify this uncertainty.
The effect of viewing associations as entities is discussed below and
in the section on Lawsuits By or Against an Association. Requiring
incorporation would make the lines of liability very clear. There was
an abortive attempt of this kind in 1944 in Colorado (American Fed-
eration of Labor v. Reilly),30 but it failed to have effect.
In recent years the courts have shown a tendency to fasten li-
ability on both the organization and all persons concerned in wrongs
done by labor unions. Thus some courts have used the concept of
conspiracy of this purpose, when planned picketing violence was
charged by an injured person.31 And some courts have held a union
29a Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 320 N.Y.S. 2d 994 (N. V. Sup. Ct. 1971).
30 American Fed'n. of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P. 2d 145, 160 A.L.R. 87.3
(1944).
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not liable for an assault by its pickets, 32 while other courts have held
that the union is liable, even as a "corporate" entity. 3 Some courts
have viewed only labor unions as "corporate" entities in such cases.
34
Some people have urged that all nonprofit organizations be viewed
as legal entities in such cases. 35 For lawsuit purposes, today, statu-
tory permission to sue or be sued in a common name is usual.36 But
treatment of a trade association or fraternal order as not a legal en-
tity has a long history,37 with contribution being ordered as to mem-
bers who authorize or ratify assumptions of obligations or debts. 8
6. Charitable Trusts (unincorporated foundations). These are a
special category of nonprofit organization, being an "organization"
principally in the sense that they usually consist of a board of trustees,
and have a small staff of officers. They have become numerous in
recent years. But incorporation does not eliminate the trust aspects
of charitable corporation assets, such as the cy pres doctrine, etc.,
discussed below.
According to the Patman Committee investigation report in 1962,
wherein the author served as Consultant to the Congressional Com-
mittee, foundations (incorporated and unincorporated) increased to
45,124 tax-exempt foundations in 1960 as against 12,295 in 1952.39
Congressman Patman charged that many foundations were used as
tax-free cloaks for private business operation.40 Others, including
the author, had made the same charge as to various "charities"
earlier.41 For such a purpose, the unincorporated charitable trust
form has some advantages over incorporation. 42
81 Wallick v. International Union of Elec. R. & M. W., 90 Ohio L. Abs. 584 (C. P. 1962).
32 Benoit v. Amalgamated Local 229 U.ER.M.W., 150 Conn. 266, 188 A. 2d 499 (1963).
83 United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. Humphreys, 203 Va.
781, 127 S. E. 2d 98 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962 (1963). Entity view: Miazga
v. International Union of Operating Engr's, 2 Ohio St. 2d 49, 205 N. E. Zd S84
(1965); Boozer v. UAW; Local 457, 279 N. E. 2d 428 (11. App. 1972).
34 Marshall v. International Longshoremen's & W.U.L.G, D. 1, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 22
Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P. 2d 987 (1962) (especially court's footnote # 1); and see,
Daniels v. Sanitarium Ass'n, Inc., 30 Cal. Rptr. 828, 381 P. 2d 652 (1963); Noted,
37 CALIF. L. REV. 130 (1964); 10 WAYNE L. RE. 444 (1964).
35 Oleck, Non-Profit Associations as Legal Entities, 13 CLEVE-MAR. L. REV. 350 (1964);
and see Daniels v. Sanitarium Ass'n, Inc., 30 Cal. Rptr. 828, 381 P. 2d 652 (1963) ;
Titus v. Tacoma Smelterman's Union Local # 25, 62 Wash. 2d 461, 383 P.2d 504,
510 (1963).
So FED. R. Civ. P. 17 (b); N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE LAW & RULES, § 1025 (McKinney 1963);
Sturges, Unincorporated Asociations as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L. J. 383 (1933).
37 Trade Issociation: Cousin v. Taylor, 115 Ore. 472, 239 P. 96, 41 A.L.R. 750 (1925).
Fraternal order: Meriwether v. Atkin, 137 Mo. App. 32, 119 S. W. 36 (1909).
28 Azzolini v. Order of Sons of Italy, 119 Conn. 681, 179A. 201 (1935).
39 HOUSE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS. TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHAR-
ITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY; chairman's report (1962).
40 Id. See, Krasnowiecki & Brodsky, Comment on the Patman Report, 112 U. PA. L. REV.
190 (1963); Good Will Home Ass'n. v. Erwin, 266 A.2d 218 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1970).
41 Oleck, Foundations Used as Business Devices, 9 CLEv-MA. L. REV. 339 (1960).
Of course other types of organizations also may cloak business purposes behind a
mantle of charity or education, or etc., such as the "boys home" that ran a school
that charged $2800 tuition fee. Good Will Home Ass'n v. Erwin, 266 A. 2d 218 (Me.
Sup. Jud. Ct. 1970) ; this "purpose" being held to be ultra vires.
42 Id. See Wallace, How to Save Money by Giving It Away, 47 MARoUETTE L. REV. 1
(1963); Comment, Charitable Trusts and Inducements to Violate the Law, 20 WASH.
(Continued on next page)
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It is to be doubted that the "self-dealing" prohibitions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 will completely cure this. Such a unit often is
set up with endowment consisting of stock of business corporations
controlled by the founder. Control is fastened onto the corporations
by the deed of trust43 that conveys their stock, and it provides (for
the founder) gift-tax benefits (deductions), income and other tax
avoidance, perpetuation of control, fine public relations, low cost
research and product development, competitive advantage over
companies that pay full taxes, ready source of capital, and thus far
not much real governmental regulation. Just how the new self-deal-
ing restrictions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 will affect such
devices is yet to be seen. 44
Foundations still often are spoken of (among legal cognoscenti)
as "business devices," "straw men" for tax advantage use, and as
"venture capital" devices.45 Congressional investigations of them, in
1961-2 (Patman Committee) and 1969-70 (Mills Committee), made
a lot of headlines but so far only a few uncertain, though hoped-for,
reforms.46 In late 1969, with President Nixon threatening a veto, the
Congress had to soft-pedal or drop most of the really vital tax re-
forms sternly promised not long before that time,47-not that some
of our statesmen needed much urging to do so.
In the 1930's there were about 240 foundations in this country
(6 in Ohio, 58 in New York, etc.). 48 Then, the Foundation Directory
Edition 3 (1967) said there were 6,803 in 1966 (463 in Ohio, 1,822 in
New York) as of 1965 figures. It also said there were 18,000, but that
10,000 were "very small" (i.e., assets less than $200,000 or making
grants less than $10,000 per year). But in 1969 the I.R.S. official list
of tax-free foundations registered with it, numbered 30,262. 49 This
latter list showed 1,493 registered in Ohio, while the Foundation
Directory said 463 (a disparity of 1,030).
(Continued from preceding page)
& LEE L. REV. 85 (1963) ; Lusk, The Uncertain Future of Charitable Trusts, 15 ALA.
L. REv. 390 (1963).
43 See, In re Scholler, 403 Pa. 97, 169 A.2d 554 (1961).
44 See, Eliasberg, New Law Threatens Private Foundations: An Analysis of the Neec
Restrictions, 32 J. TAXATION (3) 156 (Mar. 1970), for a "management" ("tax ad-
vantages desired") view of the new statute.
45 See, 1 OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW, 533 (supp. 1965) and vol. 2 at 632 and
vol. 3 at 520. As to "straw men," used by oil companies as conduits for holding
mineral rights and using depletion allowances for total tax evasion, see Lang,
"Charity" Saves Oilmen Tax Millions, Plain Dealer, Nov. 24, 1969 at 1. [e.g., one
foundation in 1967-8 handled almost $3 million and gave $25 (yes, $25, total) as
its charitable distributions.].
46 Id., House Ways & Means Progress Report, 10 FOUNDATION NEWS (4) 139 (July-
Aug. 1969).
47 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 5, 1969 at 1.
4 FOUNDATION DIRECTORY (lSt ed. 1939). As to the history of foundations, see WEAVER,
U.S. FOUNDATIONS, esp. 14-16 (1967).
49 New York Times, Jan. 9, 1969, at 28, col. 8. The list book can be had for $6.50 from
the Govt. Printing Office.
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The Foundation Library Center's 1967 Foundation Directory said
foundations then owned $19.6 billion in assets. But in early 1969
the New York attorney-general's investigation in New York alone,
found an "alarming rate" of cases of foundation funds diverted to
personal uses, and % of the 13,50,0 foundations that had registered
there owned $25 billion in that state; and the investigation had not
yet ended.50 He said that in New York alone the number of founda-
tions was increasing at about 100 per month. The 1972 edition of the
Foundation Directory set the total assets figure at $25.2 billion, and
described 5454 foundations but said that there are over 20,000 others
which make grants of less than $25,000 per year. It added that foun-
dations only account for about 9 percent of the nation's total annual
private philanthropy, though they are generally thought to be much
more significant than that. About 70 percent of the foundations were
founded after 1950, according to the Directory; which fact does not
seem to be consistent with the numbers and dates set forth in earlier
editions of the book.
A "deed of trust" setting up a foundation endowed with business
corporation stock may evade the basic principle of corporation sta-
tutes and law, that control shall not be taken away from the board
of directors. The legal phrase often used is that "the board of direc-
tors shall not be sterilized."
Supine submission by the corporations' respective boards of di-
rectors, of course, warrants (but rarely results in) quo warranto
action by the Secretary of State or Attorney General. How effective
the new rules against "self-dealing," in the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
will be in curbing these abuses is yet to be seen. As long as perpetual
life and tiny taxation of only net investment income hold true, for
foundations (as they do) the temptation towards (and ease of) abuses
probably will continue. The new rules, placing a 20 % limit on business
stock ownership, ignore the facts that 20 percent may suffice for
control and that "partnerships" aimed at avoiding the rule are an
obvious route for evasion, for example.
Statutory provisions for charitable trusts are brief and incom-
plete in most states. The Ohio statute5' is typical. It provides for
methods of incorporation, and has had brief provisions as to officers
and management. In practical effect it adds nothing regarding unin-
corporated charitable trusts. What is said hereinabove about nonprofit
associations generally applies also to unincorporated charitable trusts,
with the added difficulties (as concerns its "organization" aspects)
that result from the impact of the law of trusts.
Six types of trusts generally are regarded as charitable: relief of
poverty, aid to education, aid to religion, health promotion, commu-
nity benefit, and aid to government.
50 New York Times, Jan. 18, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
51 OHIO REV. CoDE § 1719 (Page 1953).
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Mere benevolence, such as a trust for division of a fund among
a group of school children, is not an "educational purpose," as the
children might use the money for other than educational purposes.
Thus it is not a charitable trust. 62 If the trustee had been directed to
buy books for the children, on the other hand, that would have been
a charitable trust.
A trust for the benefit of a small group such as relatives (or em-
ployees) of the settlor, even for an educational purpose, in some
states is not a valid charitable trust because it lacks the required true
trust concept of public spirit.53 Likewise, the American and Can-
adian Internal Revenue Services may refuse tax exemptions for a
trust that benefits only employees of the settlor.
Cy pres doctrine: usually the trust will not fail even if that par-
ticular purpose becomes impossible to achieve. The court will order
use of the fund for a similar charitable purpose. This is on the theory
that the settlor would have wanted his intention carried out "as
nearly as possible," if his main motive was charitable. 54
If the purpose of the settlor is very specific, and is not funda-
mentally an expression of a general charitable intent, failure of that
purpose means failure of that trust. In such case the cy pres doctrine
ordinarily will not be applied.55
Association Property
Only a human being, or a group of humans recognized as a legal
entity, can hold title to property, unless specific statutes provide
otherwise. Early common law established that rule, and it still applies.
When title to property is conveyed to a group having an artificial
name, the conveyance to that name is meaningless unless the group
is a legal entity (such as a corporation)--except as special statutes
may validate such a transfer.
Therefore, when property is conveyed to an informally associated
group, the courts ordinarily view the conveyance as a transfer to the
individual persons who comprise the group. 56 What this means is
52 Shenandoah Valley Nat'l; Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 63 S.E.2d 786 (1951).
53 In re Compton (1945) Ch. 1923. Not valid for employees: Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n.
Endowment v. Robbins, 10 Pa. D. & C. 2d 637 (C. P. Dauph. 1955); Valid: In re
Barbieri, 8 Misc. 2d 753, 167 N.Y.S. 2d 962 (1957); Boxer v. Boston Symphony,
339 Mass. 369, 159 N.E.2d 336 (1959). The trustee, even if corporate, is not really
the owner. Lefkowitz v. Cornell Univ., 62 Misc. 2d 95, 308 N.Y.S. 2d 85 (1970).
Policy, rather than "magic words" is the test. Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
City of Quincy, 258 N.E.2d 745 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1970).
54 Thatcher v. St. Louis, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S.W.2d 677 (1934) ; In re Byrd's Will, 62
Misc. 2d 232, 303 N.Y.S. 2d 97, 101 (1970) ; Haywood House v. Trustees of Dona-
tions and Bequests, 27 Conn. Sup. 176, 233 A.2d 5 (1967); and see, Brookes, Foun-
dations and Their Tax Problems, 41 TAXEs 742 (1963).
55 Industrial Nat'l. Bank v. Drysdale, 83 R.I. 172,' 114 A.2d 191 (1955) ; Industrial
Nat'l. Bank of R.I. v. Guiteras, 267 A.2d 706, 711 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1970). But, the
Doctrine of Approximation may apply. Daggett v. Children's Center, 28 Conn. Super.
468, 266 A.2d 72 (1970).
58 Normandy Consol. School Dist. v. Harral, 315 Mo. 602, 286 S.W. 86 (1926)1
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that each person has become a part-owner. Title can now be con-
veyed only with his consent, and subject to the legal rights of his
family, heirs and creditors.57 A clumsier method of holding title to
property is hard to imagine.
Although the Uniform Partnership Act, which has been widely
adopted, permits the transfer of title to a business partnership as an
entity, it does not permit transfer front the partnership as an entity,
except with the consent of each partner. 58 And in some states a
transfer of title to an unincorporated association is absolutely void.5 9
A partial cure for this impossible situation is the designation, by
the association members, of trustees to take hold, and convey title
on their behalf.60 But this solution is made undesirable by another
rule of law-the rule against perpetuities. This rule forbids title to be
tied up (e.g., in trust) by the wishes of the transferor for a period
longer than that measured by "two lives in being" (i.e., the lifetime of
the longer-lived of two designated persons).
This rule makes an exception for charitable trusts-an exception
that may not apply if the association is merely "nonprofit" and not
actually "charitable" in purpose. Thus, trusts for fraternal associa-
tions have been held to be invalid under this rule,61 and in other
cases have been held to be valid.62
Solution of this puzzle now is provided in some states by statutes
affecting specially designated types of religious societies and other
highly charitable associations. These statutes permit taking title in
the group name.63 All the states make a general provision to this
effect for profit-making associations (partnerships)364 A similar gen-
eral provision for nonprofit associations would simplify the prob-
lem. As it is, many associations prefer to incorporate simply to gain
this advantage. In New York, for example, incorporation is encour-
57 Apostolic Holiness Union v. Knudson, 21 Idaho 589, 123 P. 473 (1912). Many states
have statutes defining "corporations" as including associations for jurisdictional,
tax, and other purposes, but these statutes apply primarily to business organizations.
See, U.M.W. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 27 A.L.R. 762 (1922) unincor-
porated union held liable, in union name, to treble damages under Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note (1963) and STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 7 (2d
cd. 1949) ; Bankers Trust Co. v. Kncc, 222 Iowa 988, 263 N.W. 549 (1935). Corpor-
ations can be members of associations: 4 OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § 1795
(supp. 1965).
58 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 8 (3) (4), 10 (2).
59 State v. Sunbeam Rebekah Lodge No. 180, 169 Ore. 253, 127 P.2d 726 (1942).
60 Venus Lodge No. 62, F.A.&M. v. Acme Benevolent Ass'n., Inc., 231 N.C. 522; 58
S.E.2d 109, 15 A.L.R. 2d 1446, 1451 (1950).
61 In re Rathbone, 170 Misc. 1030, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 506 (1939) (fraternal order).
62 Bancroft v. Cook, 264 Mass. 343, 162 N.E. 691 (1928) (college fraternity). Trusts to a
church for masses are usually upheld. O'Brien, Seventy Years of Beuerts for
Masses in New York Courts, 23 FORDHAM L. REV. 147 (1954) ; Curran, Trusts for
Masses, 7 NOTRE DAME LAW. 42 (1931). See also, ScoTr, TRUSTS 298 (3d ed. 1940)
(cases).
63 See, Brown, v. Father Divine, 163 Misc. 796, 298 N.Y.S. 642 (1937).
64 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 8(3), 8(4), 10(2).
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aged by a statute that permits an incorporated association to take
title to association property merely by incorporating.
65
Tax Exemption: Insofar as property is used within the state for
the truly charitable purposes of an association, it is free in most
states from property taxes, inheritance and gift taxes.66 Tax exemp-
tion is a subject that requires separate treatment, and it cannot be
treated here. 66a
Such property as association records is subject to ordinary gov-
ernmental regulation and supervision, including investigation. But
the Constitutional guaranties against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures, which apply to natural persons, do not protect association prop-
ery. The unincorporated association is not a "person" in this sense.67
Such property as an automobile must be registered in the name
of an individual, not of the association. This, again, is because the
association is not a legal "person" for this purpose, unless a specific
statute so provides. 6
Such property as a name or its goodwill usually is protected by
general statutes against unfair appropriation by third persons.69
Lawsuits by or Against an Association
At common law, not being a legal entity, an association can sue
or be sued only in a representative capacity.7 0 That is, a trustee or
director must act on behalf of the association. He personally is named
as a party, though only in a representative sense.
65 N. Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. L. § 402, 403, 1405 (McKinney 1970).
66 MacGregor v. Commissioner, 327 Mass. 484, 99 N.E.2d 468 (1950 inheritance and
gift taxes).
6Oa Set, for example: Non-profit organization's apartment house gets no property tax
exemption where tenants pay rent. Friendship Manor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n., 487
P.2d 1272 (Utah 1971); Leased-out parts of a building of a charity organization
may get no tax exemption. Milton Hospital & Convalescent Home v. Board of
Assessors, 271 N.E.2d 745 (Mass. S. Ct. 1971) ; No state tax exemption for fraternal
order. In re Estate of Allen, 94 Cal. Rptr. 648 (App. 1971) ; Nor for sports club.
State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs. v. Fort Wayne Sport Club, Inc., 258 N.E. 2d 874 (Ind.
App. 1970); Nor for veteran's association. In re Application of Am. Legion, 20
Ohio St. 2d 121, 254 N.E.2d 21 (1969). Nor for an old peoples "home" that charged
a big entry fee ($9,000 to $20,500). Willow v. Munson, 43 Ill. 2d 203, 251 N.E.2d
249 (1969). Not for a university restaurant. Ohio Northern Univ. v. Tax Comm'rs.
21 Ohio App. 2d 113, 255 N.E. 2d 297 (1970). As to charitable operation as the test
of tax exemption right (as against social and other functions) see, Sahara Grotto
& Styx, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs. 261 N.E. 2d 873 (Ind. App. 1970) ; In re
application of Dana W. Morey Foundation, 21 Ohio App. 2d 230, 256 N.E. 2d 232
(1970). The following articles may prove helpful: Note, Tax-Exempt Status of
Public Interest La'w Firms, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 228 (1972) ; Graves, When Will Poli-
tical Activities of Unions and Associations Cost Them Their Exemption? J. TAXA-
TiON 254 (1971) ; Fleming, Charitable Trusts Under the Tax Reform Alct, 48 TAXES
757 (1970).
67 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
68 Hanley v. American Ry Express Co., 244 Mass. 248, 138 N.E. 323 (1923).
69 Ancient Egyptian Arabic Order of Nobles of the Mystic Shrine v. Michaux, 279
U.S. 737 (1929).
70 See, Sturges, Unincorporated .4ssociations as Parties to 4ctions, 33 YALE L. J. 383
(1924).
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But by 1922 the United States Supreme Court had ruled that,
even in the absence of statutes, an unincorporated association (there,
a labor union) could be sued as an entity, in its own name, for its
agents' torts. 71 This rule was codified in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 72 It later was restated, as to labor unions, by the Labor
Management Relations Act, to make damages payable only by the
Association, not against a member.73 But then the State of Oregon
first reaffirmed the common law rule as its rule and then made it
not the rule for unions.74 And in 1960 a federal court upheld a suit
against a trustee of a union welfare fund which, under Pennsylvania
law, could be sued as a "foreign corporation or similar entity. ' 75
Then, in 1962, in the case of Marshall v. ILWU, the Supreme Court
ruled that a member could sue an unincorporated association (labor
union) as an entity, for torts committed by members. 76 And in 1965
Ohio adopted the "legal entity" view of nonprofit organizations. 77
The difficulties of the old view of unincorporated associations have
about worn out the patience of the courts. 78 In 1972, for example,
Illinois ruled that unincorporated associations may be treated as
corporations for lawsuit purposes. 78 a
Today, many states specifically authorize legal action to be
brought in the association name, or against the association itself.7 9
Statutes permitting legal action in the association's own name now
are found in California, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, and several
71 U.M.W. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
72 FED. R. CIR. P. 17 (b).
73 29 U.S.C. § 185 (b) (1947).
74 Benz v. Companio Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 233 F.2d 62, 68 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd. 353
U.S. 138 (1957); Note, 43 AB.A.J. 638 (1957). But, said that labor unions
will be viewed as entities for everything in Browner v. Sanders, 244 Ore. 302, 417
P.2d 1009, 1012 (1966).
75 Parlovscak v. Lewis, 274 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1960).
76 Marshall v. ILWU Local 6, Dist. 1, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P.2d 987
(1962) ; Note, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 909 (1962); Note, 1963 DUKE L. J. 197. This de-
cision was limited to labor unions by the court. See also, Daniels v. Sanitarium
Ass'n., Inc., 30 Cal. Rptr. 828, 381 P.2d 652 (1963), Note, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 444
(1964).
77 Miazga v. International Union of Oper. Engrs., 2 Ohio St. 2d 49, 205 N.E. 2d 884
(1965); c/. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Amer. v. Humphreys, 203 Va.
781, 127 S.E.2d 98 (1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 962 (1963).
78 Kingsley v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 530, 323 Ill. App. 353, 55 N.E.2d 554
(1944); Curtis v. Albion-Brown's Post 590 Am. Legion, 74 I11. App. 2d 144, 219
N.E. 2d 386, 389 (1966). See Note, Hazards of Enforcing Claims Against Unincor-
porated Associations in Florida, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 211 (1964.).
78a Boozer v. U.A.W., Local 457, 279 N.E.2d 428 (111. App. 1972).
79 E.g., PENNA. R. Civ. P., rules 2152, 1253, 15 U.S.C.A. §§1-7 (labor unions in anti-trust
cases) ; 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-161 (labor unions generally); N. J. STAT. ANNo., tit.
2A, c.64; N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE L. & RULES § 1025 (McKinney 1963); OKLA. STAT.
ANNOT. tit. 12 §§ 182; OHio REV. CODE, §§ 1745.01, 1745.02 (Page 1955) (execution
may be only against association assets) ; but, Lyons v. American Legion Post, 172
Ohio St. 331, 175 N.E.2d 733 (1961) also permitted execution against members;
Marsh v. General Grievance Committee, 1 Ohio St. 2d 165, 205 N.E.2d 571, 573
(1965). But criminal liability may not apply to an association for the acts of an
individual: Ridgeport v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 97 Ohio App. 245, 56 Ohio Op.
33, 125 N.E.2d 202 (1954).
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other states.8 0 But in Massachusetts (and Illinois until 1972 appar-
ently) for example, an unincorporated labor union apparently is not
a legal entity according to some decisions. No court judgment can
be issued for it or against it, in its own name. Such a judgment may
be entered only for or against its members, except a mere declara-
tory judgment.8'
In some states, such as New York and Ohio, action naming either
the association or its representative is permitted.8 2 In Indiana, New
York and Pennsylvania, suit may be brought in the name of an officer,
as well, though Indiana does not allow the suit against the association
as such.8 3
The local courts usually assume jurisdiction over unincorporated
associations whenever a branch of the association (such as a union
local) carries on activities within the state. In New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania and many other states, the tests of "doing busi-
ness" that apply to any foreign (out-of-state) corporation are applied
also to foreign associations. The presence and representative activity
of local agents is the basic test of local court jurisdiction over foreign
organizations.8 4
Under the present Federal Labor Management Law, labor dispute
suits may be carried on in the federal courts in the organization name
of a labor association, which is considered a legal entity.85
The Bankruptcy Act permits a nonprofit association, like a non-
profit corporation, to go into voluntary bankruptcy proceedings as
an entity. At the same time, it generally forbids involuntary pro-
ceedings to be brought against either, except when some material
part of the organization's activities are profit-making. The problem
of insolvency procedures is a large and complex one. For a proper
understanding special works should be consulted.8 6
It is uncertain how far an association properly may go into pro-
tecting the personal rights of its members by legal action. In some
cases, however, the boundaries are clear. For example, a professional
society clearly may bring suit to stop unauthorized practice of the
profession by unlicensed persons or organizations. In so doing, the
80 See, Fredstrom v. Giroux Post No. 11 of Am. Legion, 94 F.Supp. 983, (W.D. Mich.
1951).
81 Bakery & Confectionery Wrorkers Union v. Hall Baking Co., 320 Mass. 286, 69 N.E.
2d 111, 167 A.L.R. 986; Murley v. Painters Local 14, 273 N.E.2d 538 (I1. App. 1971).
But see contra, note 121, infra.
82 See, Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (1951) ; Stefania v. McNiff, 49
Misc. 2d 480, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 854., 857 (1966); Marsh v. General Grievance Commit-
tee, 1 Ohio St.2d 165, 205 N.E.2d 571 (1965) (suit against a committee) ; Miazga v.
International Union of Operating Eng'rs., 2 Ohio St.2d 49, 205 N.E.2d 884, 886
(1965).
83 See, note 34 and note 37, sufira; Slusser v. Romine, 102 Ind. App. 25, 200 N.E. 731
(1936).
84 See, Quinn v. Pershing, 367 Pa. 426, 80 A.2d 712 (1951); and 29 U.S.C. § 185(c)
(1947) (labor unions).
8 Set, note 73 supra.
s8 See, for a short study, OLECK, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW (1959 supp. ed.).
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society is acting properly in protection of the personal interests of
its members.8 7 On the other hand, when the acts of the unlicensed
persons are criminal, public policy requires that public authorities
(not private organizations) act to protect the rights of individuals.8 8
The same is true in non-criminal regulatory matters which affect sub-
santial numbers of people, as in regulation of public places of assem-
bly or of the purity of food offered for sale.
89
In any event, an unincorporated association has the general right
to act on behalf of its members as a friend or advisor of the court
(amicus curiae). But it is up to the court to decide whether or not it
will listen.90 Labor laws give to unions the specific right to act on
behalf of their members in securing for them better working condi-
tions or redress of denials of their rights as workers.
Co-principal doctrine: In a business partnership the negligence of
a partner or employee is imputed to all the partners, including a
partner injured thereby. 1 Thus, a partner injured by concurrent
negligence of a third person and his co-partner has no action against
the third person, because the contributory negligence of his co-
partner is charged to the injured partner. 92 In effect he sues himself.
This doctrine has been carried over to most non-profit unincor-
porated associations. 93 It applies clearly to small organizations but is
of doubtful validity to large, well organized unincorporated associa-
tions.94 In an injury to an initiate, however, a large group (Temple of
the Mystic Shrine) was held liable.95 In labor organizations the doc-
trine has been sought to be invoked in recent years, but the Marshall
case is the rule today, and it contradicts the old rule.
Entity doctrine: Most recently many courts have ruled that a non-
profit unincorporated association is a legal entity equivalent to a
corporation in this respect; and this seems to be the emerging general
rule.96
87 State Bar of Oklahoma v. Retail Credit Ass'n., 170 Okla. 246, 37 P.2d 954 (1934)
Latson v. Eaton, 341 P.2d 247, 248 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1959).
ss New Hampshire Bd. of Registration in Optometry v. Scott Jewelry Co., 90 N.H. 368,
9 A.2d 513 (1939).
89 Western Pa. Restaurant Assn. v. Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374; 77 A.2d 616 (1951); and
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 710 (guidelines); and see, Waite v. Holmes, 133 Mont.
512, 327 P.2d 399, 403, 404 (1958).
90 See, Bernstein, I/olunteer A4mici Curiae in Civil Rights Cases, 1 N.Y.L.S. STU. L.
REV. 95 (1952); and, hospital association as amicus curiae in a hospital-public
interest problem; Matthews v. Ingleside Hospital, Inc., 254 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio C.P.
1969).
91 Aroot. 14 A.L.R. 2d 473 (1950).
92 Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal.2d 183, 288 P.2d 12 (1955).
93 DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333 (1950).
94 Crane, Liability of Unincorporated Association for Tortious Injury to a Member,
16 VAND. L. REV. 319 (1963).
95 Thomas v. Dunne, 131 Colo. 20, 279 P.2d 427 (1955).
,5 Miazga v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs., 2 Ohio App.2d 153, 196 N.E.
2d 324 (1964) ; Marshall v. I.L.W.U. 57 Cal.2d 781, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P.2d 987
(1962) ; Inglis v. Operating Eng'rs. Local 12, 18 Cal. Rptr. 187, af 'd. 23 Cal. Rptr.
403, 373 P.2d 467 (1962) ; International Union of Operating Eng'rs. Local 12 v. Fair
(Continued on next page)
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Association Agents' and Members' Powers and Liabilities
Members of unincorporated associations may be viewed as mem-
bers of a multi-member partnership, when considered in the broadest
sense, and then each is liable for the acts of the other done in the
course and scope of the "partnership. ' 97 But non-profit associations,
mainly because they do not "seek profit," are not partnerships. 9
An unincorporated association, whether it be a fraternal organ-
ization or a labor union, like any ordinary partnership, has no legal
entity or existence apart from its members. In legal effect each mem-
ber becomes both a principal and an agent as to all other members
for the actions of the group itself; accordingly as a principal he has
no cause of action against a co-principal (the group) for the wrongful
conduct of their common agent.9 9 Thus, courts appear to have followed
the general rule of non-liability of the unincorporated association in
an action for negligence by one of its members. Typically the cases
have involved fraternal organizations or beneficial associations. 100
The general rule as to associations was arrived at by applying
to other forms of voluntary, unincorporated associations the rules of
law developed in the field of business partnerships. Under traditional
legal concepts the partnership is regarded as an aggregate of indivi-
duals with each partner acting as agent for all other partners in
the transaction of partnership business, and the agents of the part-
nership acting as agents for all of the partners. When these concepts
are transferred bodily to other forms of voluntary associations such
as fraternal organizations, clubs and labor unions, which act nor-
mally through elected officers and in which the individual members
have little or no authority in the day-to-day operations of the asso-
ciation's affairs, reality is apt to be sacrificed to theoretical formalism.
The courts, in recognition of this fact, have from case to case gradually
(Continued from preceding page)
Employment Practices Comm'n., 81 Cal. Rptr. 47, 52 (Ct. App. 1969); Illinois see,
note 81, supra; Oleck, Non-Profit Associations as Legal Entities, 13 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 350 (1964); Note, Developments in the Law: Judicial Control of Actions of
Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1963); and see, Knight and Searle v.
Dove (1964) 2 ALL ENG. REv. 307; Note, 80 LAW Q. REv. 326 (1964).
9 Annot. 14 A.L.R. 2d 473. And see generally CONARD & KNAUSS, BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TION CASES AND MATERIALS 368 ef passim (3rd ed., 1965); CRANE & BROMBERG ON
PARTNERSHIP, § 24 (1968) ; Crane, Liability of Unincorporated Association for Tor-
tious Injury, 16 VAND. L. REv. 319 (1963); CONARD, KNAUSS & SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE
ORGANIZATION (cases) (4th ed. 1972).
98 CRANE & B3ROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP, § 13 (1968), citing UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 6(1).
99 Marshall v. IL.W.U., 57 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P.2d 978 (1962).
100 Carr v. Northern Pac. Beneficial Ass'n., 128 Wash. 40, 221 P. 979 (1924) (negligent
selection of physicians and negligent hospital care furnished) ; Koogler v. Koogler,
127 Ohio St. 57, 186 N.E. 725 (1933) (negligent maintenance of fire escape); Rosch-
mann v. Sanborn, 315 Pa. 188, 172 A.657 (1934) (negligent operation of a bus);
DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333, 14 A.L.R. 2d 470 (1950) (negligent
operation of a steam table) ; Mastrini v. Nuova Loggia Monte Grappa, 1 Pa. D. & C.
2d 245 (1954) (negligent maintenance of lodge floor) ; Duplis v. Rutland Aerie,
No. 1001, Fraternal Order of Eagles, 118 Vt. 438, 111 A.2d 727 (1955) (negligent
maintenance of stairway).
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evolved new theories in approaching the problems of such associa-
tions, and there is now a respectable body of judicial decision, es-
pecially in the field of labor-union law, which recognizes the exis-
tence of unincorporated labor unions as separate entities for a variety
of purposes, and which recognizes as well that the individual members
of such unions are not in any true sense principals of the officers of
the union or of its agents and employees so as to be bound personally
by their acts under the strict application of the doctrine of "respon-
deat superior."' 01
Like a corporation, which is an artificial entity, an association
can act only through agents or representatives. The amount of au-
thority delegated to an agent must be determined by the executive
board or the trustees, pursuant to the powers granted by the members.
The agent can bind the association only to the extent to which
he is authorized to act.102 But the general rules of principal and
agent (agency law) also apply. The apparent (seeming) authority
of an agent may bar the association from later denying that he ac-
tually had such authority. But if an agent clearly exceeds his author-
ity, the members are not liable, if they have not negligently or
fraudulently permitted third persons to be misled. Persons dealing
with an agent have a duty to make reasonable inquiry, and to demand
reasonable proof of the actual scope of his authority. 103
The acts of the association's agents may either be authorized in
advance or ratified or adopted afterwards. In both cases the mem-
bers of the association assume liability.10 4
An uncertain implied authority inheres in some types of agency.
Thus, an agent who is authorized to buy something for a certain price
has implied power either to pay cash or to give association notes
or other paper in payment, unless the authorization is specific on
these points. In certain types of associations, such as social clubs, it
is generally held that an agent can bind only the funds of the asso-
ciation, such as dues and contributions. The personal liability of mem-
bers of such associations cannot be involved by the agent, at least
in routine matters. This is because it is generally understood that
most such associations are very limited in their purposes and opera-
tions.105
But if the facts and circumstances give to the agent the apparent
power to commit the members personally, they may actually be
bound by his actions. For example, if a club's agent leases a club-
house in the name of the club, some cases have held that this binds
the members. Ordinarily, of course, club members expect and consent
101 Marshall v. I.L.W.U., 57 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P.2d 987 (1962).
102 Humphrys v. Republican Cent. Campaign Comm., 320 Pa. 353, 182 A. 366 (1936).
103 See, Haldeman v. Addison, 221 Iowa 218, 265 N.W. 358 (1936).
104 See, Empire City Job Print, Inc. v. Harbord, 244 App. Div. 6, 277 N.Y.S. 795 (1935).
105 See generally, CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 98.
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to no such extent of liability. But if the lessor has reasonable cause
to believe they did so consent, he may enforce his rights against
them personally as well as against the association.'
1 6
In most cases, the liability of members of an association is deter-
mined by the general principles of agency law. Little significant
legislation exists on this precise point (except for labor unions, which
are treated in the next section). In one case a member of a trade as-
sociation was held to be not liable for the salary of the editor of the
association's journal, because the member was inactive.10 7 But in an-
other (old) case, the members of a college alumni group were held
liable for the costs of a yearbook, because they had chosen one mem-
ber to publish it.1o8
In most associations, the directors also are the officers of the
association, and thus are its principal agents. A large association may
also have many employees, some of whom may have the status of
agents.
An association is liable, as a principal, for the negligence or other
wrongful acts of an agent, when these acts are committed by him
during, and within the scope of, his authorized duties. What is and
what is not "in the course and scope of his employment" is a ques-
tion of fact in each case.'0
9
Labor Union Agents' and Members' Powers and Liabilities
Today there is a substantial body of law governing agents and
transactions in the trade union (labor union). But even this body of
law is so vague and conflicting that it is a very uncertain guide.
Unions today are non-profit in purpose, insofar as profit of the
membership as a group is concerned. It is true that the purpose of a
union is to obtain profits for its members in terms of higher wages
and other benefits. A labor union thus in a sense combines non-profit
and profit purposes. But the same can be said of almost any non-profit
organization. Its purpose almost always is to obtain benefits for its
members-and often in terms of pecuniarily valuable advantages.
Labor unions, however, have one great advantage in this respect.
Statutes require employers to recognize and bargain with unions and
forbid them from directly discouraging their employees from joining
unions. Very few statutes, at present, require unions to use only
gentle means in dealing with employers.
The power of modern unions, and the public's fear of their power,
is illustrated by the fact that they are expressly forbidden, by statute,
106 See, Korstad v. Williams, 80 Wash. 452, 141 P. 881 (1914).
107 Stone v. Guth, 232 Mo. App. 217, 102 S.W.2d 738 (1937).
100 Wilcox v. Arnold, 162 Mass. 577, 39 N.E. 414 (1895).
109 See generally CRANE & BROMBERG, supra, note 96; PROSSER, TORTS, § 80 (4th ed.
1971) ; Note, Liability of Members and Officers of Non-Profit Associations for Con-
tracts and Torts, 42 CALIF. L. Rpv. 812 (1954) ; and, Note, Enforcing a Contractual
Claim Against an Unincorporated Association in Wisconsin, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 444.
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from contributing to political campaigns. 110 Yet this does not restrict
freedom of political opinions, as exercised in discussions in labor
journals published by unions."' And the devices for evasion of this
rule, while interesting, do not belong in this work.
Agents of a union may bind the union only on the express au-
thorization of the members." 2 Many cases have held that the em-
ployer acts at his peril if he acts merely on the implied or apparent
authority of union representatives.113 This is unlike the general law
of agency, and clearly tends to contribute to the corruption of the
labor movement. If the unions can freely disown unpalatable arrange-
ments based on agreements not specifically authorized by the mem-
bers, it is actually an advantage (in the short view) to be careless
about.the character of union representatives. A partial remedy for
this difficulty was attempted by the 1947 Federal Act in making
consent or ratification not controlling.114
Distinctly the leading case on modern views of the labor union
as an association (e.g.., an entity rather than a loose partnership) is
the 1962 Marshall case, which has been cited several times herein-
above.115 Even before that, the federal courts had said that an un-
incorporated labor union could be sued as an entity in federal
courts.1 16 The Supreme Court also said:117
Structurally and functionally, a labor union is an insti-
tution which involves more than the private or personal
interests of its members. It represents organized, insti-
tutional activity as contrasted with wholly individual activity.
This difference is as well defined as that existing between
individual members of the union. The union's existence in
fact, and for some purposes in law, is as perpetual as that of
any corporation, not being dependent upon the life of any
member .. . "The actions of one individual member no more
bind the union than they bind another individual member
unless there is proof that the union authorized or ratified
the acts in question. At the same time, the members are not
subject to either criminal or civil liability for the acts of the
union or its officers as such unless it is shown that they person-
ally authorized or participated in the particular acts . "118
110 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1948).
M" United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
112 W. A. Snow Iron Works, Inc. v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, 116 N.E. 801 (1917),;
Boylston Housing Corp. v. O'Toole, 321 Mass. 74, 538 N.E. 2d 288, 299 (1947).
I's Ste, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. U.S., 330 U.S. 395 (194-7) (esp. the dissent). But,
"authorization" or "ratification" are not controlling under the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1947).
114 See, Humphrys v. Republican Cent. Campaign Comm., 320 Pa. 353, 182 A. 366 (1936).
And for a case on difficulty of proof of deliberate wrongs, see Hill v. Eagle Glass
& Mfg. Co., 219 F. 719 (4th Cir. 1915).
115 57 Cal. 2d 781, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P.2d 987 (1962), and see, supra notes 101, 99,
and 96.
"1 UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
117 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701, 702, (1944).
158 Id. at 702, 1253.
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The labor union then was labeled "a separate legal entity," sim-
ilar to a corporation; and described as sui generis and no longer com-
parable to voluntary fraternal orders or partnerships.119 The con-
clusion in the Marshall case was that an injured member could sue
the union for damages and not be defeated by the old concept that
he was suing his "partners" and thus himself.
Contracts: A representative cannot bind the union as an entity in
some states. He can bind only the current membership, which
changes constantly. 20 In Massachusetts (according to some decisions)
and New York, on the other hand, the union is viewed as a legal
entity for this purpose.12' In either case, the membership and the
agents change quite often, creating a very foggy agency situation,
though procedural statutes usually permit suits.
In a state such as Mississippi the union's contract is a "third
party beneficiary contract." The union members are the beneficiaries.
The beneficiaries can enforce the agreement against the parties, but
the parties rarely have any enforcement powers other than those
specifically stated in the contract. 122 Usually such contracts are
strictly enforced by the courts against the employer, but not so
,strictly against the individual employee.
A more logical view is that of the federal courts, adopted by such
states as Missouri and Nebraska, that a labor contract is a direct
contract between each employee and the employer. 123 In this view
the union representatives are merely agents for the individual em-
ployees. Only under this theory can an employer logically obtain
specific performance of the contract. Otherwise, an employee always
can defy his own union, if necessary. All the union can do to force
him to honor his agreement is to expel him. If he is not afraid to
seek other kinds of work, this threat is futile.'2 4
In the internal affairs of a union, too, problems arise which
ultimately plague even the friendly employer and the public. Juris-
dictional disputes between rival factions or between rival agents
cause many uncalled-for labor troubles. Reorganizations or secessions
within unions often result in the destruction of contracts duly entered
into by union agents. Then the agreements of an agent become sub-
ject to the internal provisions of a union constitution or bylaws.
119 Id., citing Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal.2d 162, 193, 339 P.2d 801, 820 (1959).
120 Wilson v. Airline Coal Co., 215 Iowa 855, 246 N.W. 753 (1933).
111 Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N.E. 705 (1934) ; Ribner v. Rasco, Butter
& Egg Co., 135 Misc. 616, 238 N.Y.S. 132 (1929). But see, supra note 81, contra.
122 McCoy v. St. Joseph B. Ry., 229 Mo.App. 506, 77 S.W.2d 175 (1934); Yazoo &
M.V.R.R. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 S. 699 (1931); Burns v. Washington Sav-
ings, 251 Miss. 789, 171 So.2d 322, 325 (1965).
123 See, note 55 supra; McCoy v. St. Joseph B. Ry., 229 Mo.App. 506, 77 S.W.2d 175
(1934); Rentschler v. Missouri P.R.R., 126 Nebr. 493, 253 N.W. 694- (1934) ; San-
dobal v. Armour & Co., 429 F.2d 249, 252 (8th Cir. 1970).
124 Associated Master Plumbers v. Warnock & Zahrndt, Inc., 236 A.D. 882, 260 N.Y.S.
573 (1932).
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Disaffiliation of a local from the parent body, a common event in
recent years, for example, creates knotty problems as to disposition
of union funds.125
Exemption from Collective Bargaining: In some states non-profit
organizations, such as hospitals, are (or have been) exempt from ob-
ligation to bargain collectively with labor unions. 126 This exemption
was, in part, a result of the nature of hospital operation in the past.127
In most private non-profit operations, labor relations are con-
trolled by the National Labor Relations Act,128 but in some states
hospitals are specifically exempted. 129 This subject is treated below.
Injuries to Members: Remedies against the union for injuries done
to members by other members' negligence used to be quite limited,
largely because of the amorphous legal nature of non-profit asso-
ciations.130 The newer view of unions, as legal entities, has gone far
towards curing the unfair old view. 131
If the union representatives act intentionally, in causing harm
to members, the union clearly is liable.' 32 The same is true where
a special duty of representation is owed to the particular member. 3 8
Such a duty often is a question of discretion on the part of union
officers; and the courts prefer not to interfere unless abuse of a
fiduciary duty is shown. 34 And if business judgment is involved,
the discretionary aspect usually bars court interference. 135
All in all, the state of union responsibility vis-a-vis members is
still unclear. For example, it was held that a union did not violate
N.L.R.B. rules by fining strike-breaker members; the contract theory
being viewed as governing the case.136
125 Svete, Disposition of Local's Funds Upon Disaffiliation, 12 CLEV.-MAR L. REv. 539(1963).
126 See, N. Y. LABOR L. ART. 20, § 715, (McKinney 1965); Hebrew Home and Hosp.
for Chronic Sick, Inc. v. Davis, 38 Misc.2d 173, 235, N.Y.S.2d 318 (1962).
127 See, Billington, Hospitals, Unions, and Strikes, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 70 (1969).
128 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.
129 Id. § 152(2), See, Peters v. Poor Sisters, 267 N.E.2d 558 (Ind. App. 1971), and
other citations, at note 144 infra.
130 See, Marshall v. I.L.W.U., 57 Cal.2d 781, 22 Cal Rptr. 211, 371 P.2d 987 (1962) and
the old view as illustrated by Marchitto v. Central R.R. of N.J., 9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d
851 (1956) ; overruled Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825, 831(1961) ; see, Hromek v. Gemeinde, 238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941); Goins v.
Missouri Pac. Sys. Fed. of Maint. of Way Emp. U., 272 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir.
1960).
131 Marshall v. I.L.W.U., 57 Cal. 2d 781, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 37 P.2d 987 (1962).
132 International Ass'n. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
133 Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 9 Wis.2d 631, 101 N.W.2d 782 (1960). But, no
special duty was owed in Marshall v. I.L.W.U., 57 Cal.2d 781, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211,
371 P.2d 987 (1962).
134 Neider v. J. G. Van Holten & Son, Inc., 41 Wis.2d 602, 165 N;W.2d 113, 115 (1969)
Cheese v. Afram Bros. Co., 32 Wis.2d 320, 145 N.W.2d 716, 720 (1966) ; Foltz v.
Harding Glass Co., 263 F.Supp. 959 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
135 Finnegan v. Pa. R.R., 76 N.J. Super. 71, 183 A.2d 779 (1962).
136 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 182 (1967).
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Whether or not one agrees with the precise provisions of such
statutes as the Taft-Hartley Act, or the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-In-
junction Act, it is clear that carefully drawn, specific legislation still
is necessary. The modern labor union is only partly a non-profit
organization in the sense of an eleemosynary or charitable association.
To lump it indiscriminately with such organizations is simply unreal-
istic. It is "big business" in itself (more aptly,. "big labor"). Its social
importance demands special treatment and special legislation.
Associations Exemption from Collective Bargaining
The exemption of some nonprofit organizations, such as hospitals,
from the duty to engage in collective bargaining with labor unions,
has led to some difficulties.' 36a
American national policy is to encourage workers to organize
and work together, in labor unions, in order to improve their condi-
tions. 137 The duty of employers to bargain with unions, however, is
purely statutory. 138 This was held to apply to nonprofit hospitals,
the nature of most of their operations being profitable "trade"
indeed. 139 But in 1947 Congress exempted charitable hospitals from
this duty, almost casually.140 Then, in 1951, a Utah case said that the
Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act reopened the matter and gave
the states the power to control the question.141 Utah ruled that hos-
pital employees could use collective bargaining. 42
A number of states enacted laws barring labor union negotia-
tions in hospitals, while other states permitted such protection of
employees. 143 Thus Colorado, Connecticut and Massachuetts exempt
charitable hospitals from collective bargaining, while Michigan, Min-
nesota, New Jersey, and New York and some other states require
hospitals to bargain with employee unions.144 Utah, ironically, then
amended its statute, to exclude charitable hospitals. 45 Ohio's courts
have held that hospitals need not bargain collectively.
46
136- 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1947).
136b 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1964), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1964).
136c See, Billington, Hospitals, Unions and Strikes, 18 CLEV-MAR. L. REV. 70 (1969)
Laverne, Toward Equal Protection for the Non-Profit Employee, 5 SUFFOLK L. REV.
365 (1971).
137 29 U.S.C. §§ 152 et Passim.
138 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
139 NLRB v. Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 145 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945).
140 National Labor Re]. Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(2); and see, Legislative History of the
Labor-Management Act of 1947, at 1464 (1948).
141 Utah Labor Relations Bd. v. Utah Valley Hosp., 120 Utah 463, 235 P.2d 520 (1951).
142 Id.
143 Billington, supra note 136c, sets forth the statutes of the various states and the de-
cisions of the courts.
144 Id.; Indiana joined this group with the decision in Peters v. Poor Sisters of St.
Francis Seraph, 267 N.E.2d 558 (Ind. App. 1971).
145 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-1 to 15 (1966).
146 Building Serv. and Maintenance Union v. St. Luke's Hosp., 11 Ohio Misc. 218, 227
N.E.2d 265 (C. P. Cuyahoga County, 1967).
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Of course, the rising costs of hospital care have been attributed
in large part to costs of workers' services, which is quite unfair.
147
If anything, it is the physicians and the drug and supply people who,
between them, have been drawing great wealth from their hospital
connections. New York settled the debate, there, in 1967, by statute
amendment granting bargaining rights to employees of charitable
hospitals. 148 This would be the simplest and most reasonable way for
all states to end the cruelty of exploitation of hospital service
workers.
Organizing the Association
In practice many unincorporated associations just "sort of grow"
into going organizations, out of informal (often, social) meetings of
their members. This is very human, but not very wise.
The members ought to meet, more or less formally, and discuss
purposes, plans, and proposals. Then the persons concerned should
reduce their agreement to written form.
. The agreement is the Articles of Association, or sometimes, the
Constitution, or the Charter. These may contain rules for internal man-
agement procedures, or the body of internal rules may be stated
in a separate document; in either case the rules are the By-laws.
Forms of articles, constitutions and bylaws should be understood
to be merely guides. The provisions of the articles for each associa-
tion must be tailored to its purposes, personnel, funds, facilities, and
the agreed plan of operation. When the articles are duly signed and
adopted, the association comes into existence.
In some states, articles of association must be filed with the sec-
retary of state and with the clerk of the county in which the associa-
tion's principal office is located. In a few states a certificate stating
the name of the organization, its office, and its officers is required
instead. Use of an assumed (group) name also may require filing, in
the nature of licensing, with penalties for failure to file.148 ao
Managing the Association
Internal management of an unincorporated association must be
carried on as provided by the articles of association. In most states
where statutes cover the subject, the management must be in. the
hands of a board of directors or trustees consisting of at least three
(or five) persons. 149
147 See, G. Kirstein, Why Hospitals Exploit Labor, 19 THE NATION 3 (July 4, 1959).
D. Kochery & G. Strauss, The Non-Profit Hospital and the Union, 9 BuFF. L. REv.
255 (1960); E. Weissman, Non-Prolit Hospitals and Labor Unions, g CLEV.-MAR. L.
REv. 482 (1959). •
148 N. Y. LABOR L., Art. 20 §§ 700-717 (McKinney 1967).
148a N. Y. GEN. Bus. L. § 130 (McKinney 1968)*.
149 149 N. Y. GEN. ASS'Ns. L., Art. I (McKinhey 1942)...
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The rights of members of the association (other than mere social
relations) often are viewed as property rights. Interference with
such rights mainly is treated much as is many improper interference
with any property rights, by the issuance of injunctions or damage
awards by the courts.150 (See the next section, below).
The courts ordinarily will not interfere in the purely internal af-
fairs of an association, except to prevent fraud or to protect property
and civil rights.151 If, for example, a member is expelled, he must
exhaust all the remedies provided by the association's rules before
the courts will aid him, unless these remedies obviously are futile.152
And then the courts will move only if he can show some illegality
in the action against him. If he can show unfair or improper treat-
ment, the courts can and will grant damages or even order his re-
instatement. 153 When membership is valuable or necessary to him,
or is tinged with public stature or purpose as in a professional or
trade association, the courts will scrutinize an exclusion or expulsion
with particular care. 154
Membership in a private association, society, or club, or (to some
extent) in a labor union, is open only to those the members choose
to admit. And membership is not transferable unless the association's
rule so provide. This right of choosing associates is called delectus
personae. But restrictions must be reasonable. 155
The managers of an association (the directors or trustees) are
fiduciaries. They stand to the members almost in the position of full
trustees. But among members there is no such fiduciary relationship
except in special circumstances. 156
150 See, Elfer v. Marine Engr. Ben. Ass'n., 179 La. 383, 154 S. 32 (1934).
151 See, as to civil rights: Quimby v. School Dist. No. 21 of Pinal County, 10 Ariz. App.
69, 455 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1969) (dicta that discrimination in a voluntary non-profit
association, as to membership, will be subject to a judicial review in order to safe-
guard constitutional rights). As to labor unions, see, Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc.
601, 122 N.Y.S. 54 (1910) (union member expelled). And see, (inherent right, not
merely property right, of political association member who was expelled, and ques-
tion of share of value of club house use) Berrien v. Pollitzer, 83 U.S. App. D.C.
23, 165 F.2d 21 (1947).
152 Jennings v. Jennings, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 258, 91 N.E.2d 899 (1949) ; Hurwitz v. Direc-
tors Guild of America, Inc., 364 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1966) (union member could
not be expelled for failure to take a loyalty oath; the property basis was rejected
and the proceeding was based on tort).
153 Hurwitz v. Directors Guild of America, Inc., 364 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1966); Van
Daele v. Vinci, 282 N.E.2d 728 (Il. 1972) ; McCune v. Wilson, 237 S.2d 169, 173
(Fla. 1970).
154 Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 460 P.2d 495 (1969)
and see, supra note 151; Van Daele v. Vinci, 282 N.E.2d 728 (I11. 1972) (association
of grocers) ; Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 469, 79 A.2d 134 (1951) (reli-
gious association) ; courts seldom will interfere in doctrinal or procedural disputes;
Dragelvich v. Rajsich, 263 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio App. 1970) ; Serbian Orthodox Church
v. Kelemen, 21 Ohio St. 2d 154 (1970).
155 See, Johnston v. Wino, 105 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (definition of
delectus personae). See also, Page v. Edmonds, 187 U.S. 596 (1903) (transfer of
stock exchange membership). But, concerning unions see Ryan v. Simmons, 18 N. Y.
L. W. 2305 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (restriction to family members is illegal) and PENNA.
LAn. REL. AcT (1937) § 3(f), 43 Penna. Stat. § 211.3(f) (restrictions of race or
religion are illegal).
150 Boston B.B. Club v. Brooklyn B.B. Club, 37 Misc. 521, 75 N.Y.S. 1076 (1902).
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Submission to the constitution and direction of a parent body or
authority often is found in such subsidiaries as fraternal lodges,
unions, and religious associations.
The cy pres rule of the law of trusts applies to nonprofit organ-
izations. A trust fund always must be devoted as nearly as (cy pres)
is possible to the trust purpose specified by the founder. If, for ex-
ample, property is given to a religious association to benefit that
association's faith, it may not be used for a different faith. If the
association dissolves, the courts will order the property used for
other, closely similar purposes, unless specific provision for such an
eventuality was made by the founder.157
Exclusion and Expulsion of Members
(See the text above, at notes 150-156).
Denial of membership to would-be members, and expulsion of
existing members, are basically civil rights (constitutional law) prob-
lems.158 These matters are only incidentally questions of nonprofit
association law, and the principles applicable are generally the same
for unincorporated as for incorporated organizations. These often
are problems of racial or religious discrimination and of the privilege
to exercise the ordinary rights of citizenship, such as the right to
vote, free speech, freedom of petition, right to resort to the courts,
equal protection of laws in many respects, employment right, etc.
Basically, a private organization may limit its membership (ex-
ercise delectus personae-choice of the person), 15 9 unless the organiza-
tion is affected by a strong public interest.160 A "strong public interest"
may be said to be present, for example, in the constituency of a pro-
fessional society161 or a trade association. 16 2 The exceptions and limi-
tations are affected by such questions as when the 14th and 15th
Amendments to the Constitution involve "state action" as against
157 Note, Cy Pres Doctrine-and Anonymous Donors, 6 STAN. L. REV. 729-734 (1954);
Sheridan, The Cy Pres Doctrine, 32 CAN. B. R. 599-623 (1954) ; Note, Cy Pres
Doctrine, 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 205-210 (1953). See, Bell v. Carthage College, 243 N.E.
2d 23 (111. App. 1968) (applies to college that moves to another state) ; but cf., City
of Patterson v. Patterson Gen. Hosp., 250 A.2d 427 (Super. Ct. 1969), aff'd. 251
A.2d 131 (N.J. 1969) (taxpayer cannot stop relocation of a hospital).
158 Pasley, Exclusion and Expulsion From Non-Profit Organizations-The Civil Rights
Aspect, 14" CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 203 (1965); Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Asso-
ciations Not-For-Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv. 993 (1930) ; Holland, Clubs and the Race
Relations Act of 1968, 122 NEw L. J. 258 (1972) Holden, Judicial Control of Vol-
untary Associations, 4 N.Z.U.L. REv. 343 (1971); Note, Discrimination in Private
Social Clubs, 1970 DUKE L. J. 1181.
159 Supra, note 155.
100 Madden v. Queens County jockey Club, Inc., 296 N. Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697 (194-7)
Cline v. Insurance Exch. of Texas, 140 Tex. 175, 166 S.W.2d 677 (1943); Pinsker
v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 460 P.2d 495 (1969);
McCune v. Wilson, 237 S.2d 169, 173 (Fla. 1970); Van Daele v. Vinci, 282 N.E.
2d 728 (I1. 1972).
161 Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 460 P.2d 495 (1969).
162 Grempler v. Multiple Listing Bureau, 266 A.2d 1 (Md. App. 1970) ; Van Daele v.
Vinci, 282 N.E.2d 728 (II. 1972).
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private action. 163 Thus leases of public premises to organizations,
and economic aid, and public licensing may inject "state action."'164
The Civil Rights Act of 1964165 particularly applies to clubs and
organizations according to one view, and particularly does not apply
according to another view.166 Private school discrimination or segre-
gation based on race is illegal,1 7 and so is social fraternity or sorority
discrimination especially at public (state) institutions,' 68 welfare
organizations, 169 or a political "club" that is used as a mere device
for exclusion.170 But in June 1972 the United States Supreme Court
held that a private club may exclude Negroes from its restaurant,
on the theory that the granting of a liquor license is not such "state
action" as violates the constitution, and in August, 1972 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held otherwise. 171
Where exclusion or expulsion involves the right to earn a living
or other economic interests, today such action usually is viewed as
improper. This is by case law decisions in some respects, 172 and more
effectively by statutes forbidding racial discrimination by labor
unions.173 So, too, the right to belong to a professional society is up-
held when it affects the right to practice one's profession and earn
a living.174
Amendments of Articles, Constitution, or By-laws
Articles of association always should set forth precise procedures,
including the number of votes necessary, for the amendment of the
articles, the constitution, or the bylaws of the association. Or each
document may contain provisions for its own amendment. Changes
must, of course, be consistent with the law. The requirement of a two-
thirds vote is customary.
Notice provisions are important. At least ten days' notice of a
meeting should be required, and notice should be defined to include
purpose as well as time and place.
163 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) ; Comment, A Statement Against State Action,
37 S. CAL. L. REV. 463 (1964).
164 Refer to discussion and cases in Pasley article supra, note 158 at 206-212.
165 Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243, esp. § 201(e) of the Act.
166 Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc. v. Arbury, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186 (1957) (does
apply); Tillman v. Wheaten-Haven Recreation Ass'n., Inc., 451 F.2d 1211 (D.C.
Md. 1972) (does not apply).
16T Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; and see, statutes such as
N. Y. EXEc. L. § 296(4) (McKinney 1972); N. Y. STAT. ANN., § 18:25-5(1).
169 Comment, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 168 (1961).
160 Statom v. Board Comm'rs of Prince George's County, 233 Md. 57, 195 A.2d 41
(1963).
170 Pasley, supra, note 158, at 225.
171 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 40 U.S.L.W. 4715,-U.S.-,92 S.Ct. 1965 (1972). The
August decision held that a Moose Lodge must serve blacks if it allows any non-
members to use its facilities. Matter of Moose Lodge 107 of Harrisburg, Penna.,
Supr. Ct. unanimous opinion, reported in N. Y. Times, p. 40 (Aug. 2, 1972).
172 Pasley, supra, note 158 at 227, citing cases; and cases cited supra notes 153, 154.
173 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (Title 7) ; see Note, 78 HARV.
L. REv. 684 (1965); N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 43 (McKinney 1948).
174 Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc., 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961) ; Annot.
89 A.L.R.2d 964 (1963).
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The statutory provisions, in the various states, for amendments
of corporate articles and by-laws are good guides for similar action in
unincorporated associations. 175
Foreign Associations
If an association wishes to carry on activities in a state other
than where its home office is located, it is a foreign organization in
that other state. 176 Operation in another state usually involves filing
in the other state and qualifying for license to do business there.177
Most state statutes provide that a foreign association must register
if it undertakes more than occasional, isolated transactions, unless its
activities can be classified as "interstate commerce.' 178 Interstate
commerce is exempt from state regulation.
Registration usually consists of the filing of a certificate with the
the secretary of state, designating him as the agent for the service
of legal process against the association. This certificate usually must
be signed by the president, vice-president, or secretary and the sig-
nature must be notarized. The certificate usually must set forth:
1. The names and places of residence of its officers and trustees.
2. Its principal place of operation.
3. The address of its office within the state.
Failure to file usually is punished by denying the association the
right to use the local courts to enforce its contracts in the state.17
Dissolution
Statutory procedures for dissolution of corporations are good
guides for dissolution formalities of unincorporated associations. 8 0
Dissolution of an association should be provided for in its articles
of association. The procedure usually is to dissolve upon at least a
two-thirds vote, or by consent of all the members. Some articles pro-
vide that no dissolution may be voted so long as seven members vote
175 E.g., N. Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. L., Art. 8, §§ 801 et seq. (McKinney 1970); Oito
REV. CODE § 1702.38 (at 1955).
176 See, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 775 (4th ed. 1951).
177 See, for rules and fees in all states and Canadian provinces, statutes regarding filing
as a foreign corporation, 1 H. OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW, §§ 107-166 (1958,
with 1965 supp.). See est., N. Y. NOT-FoR-PROFIT CORP. L., Art. 13 §§ 1301 ft seq.(McKinney 1970) ; OHIO REV. CODE, §§ 1703.01 et seq. (1955).
178 Id.
179 N. Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. L., Art. 13, esp. § 1313 (McKinney 1970) ; OHio REV.
CODE § 1703.02 (1955); but see, Selama-Dindings Plantations v. Durham, 216
F.Supp. 104 (S. D. Ohio 1963) (as to members' right to sue) ; Local Trademarks,
Inc. v. Derrow Motor Sales, 120 Ohio App. 103, 201 N.E.2d 222 (1963) (as to what
is interstate commerce).
380 See, for samples of forms from various states, 5 H. OLEcsC, MODERN CORPORATION
LAW, Forms 1079, 1080, 1085-1095, el passim (1960 with 1965 supp.) ; and esp.
OHio REV. CODE §§ 1702.47-1702.52 (1970) ; see In re Dissolution, Cleveland
Savings Soc., 90 Ohio Abs. 3, 183 N.E.2d 234 (1962) ; In re Dissolution of Spring-
field Savings Soc., 12 Ohio Misc. 51, 230 N.E.2d 139 (1965) ; N. Y. NOT-FoR-PROFIT
CORP. L., Arts. 10 (non-judicial dissolution), 11 (judicial dissolution). (McKinney
1970).
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to continue. The other members then have little choice except to
resign, unless fraud can be shown.
Dissolution of an association by court action, for fraud or for
other good cause, always, is possible.' 8 '
After all association debts have been paid a dissolved "merely
nonprofit" association's property is divided proportionately among
the members. When a "charitable" association holds property in trust
and the achievement of purpose becomes impossible, the courts will
assign that property to some other trustee to carry on the purpose
of the donor, under the cy pres rule described above.' 82
Recently the idea of using unincorporated association form for the
purpose of winding up a dissolved charitable corporation (e.g., a
foundation) has been developed. The late Harold T. Clark of Cleveland,
a noted expert in foundation organization and management, used
this method in winding up the famous Leonard C. Hanna, Jr. Fund,
a large foundation.
After the incorporated foundation was dissolved, a Trust Agree-
ment was made by the corporate officers, setting up the unincorporated
Leonard C. Hanna, Jr. Final Fund. Remaining, unexpended assets
were given to the Final Fund, under this trust, for completion of dis-
tribution. A bank was made trustee for depositary and distribution
purposes. The directors of the corporation were named to control
distribution of the final assets by the bank (trustee). This Agreement
was filed with the Secretary of State of Ohio as part of the record
of the dissolution of the incorporated (and dissolved) foundation. 8 3
Combination of both incorporated and unincorporated association
forms, to serve various purposes (such as orderly dissolution and
winding up of a nonprofit corporation) thus is seen to be useful.
Combination of both nonprofit and profit-making associations
and/or corporations now apparently is readily possible under such
statutes as the 1970 New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law.3 4
Thus the use of classes of membership, some of corporate and some of
unincorporated associations, and others, are specifically authorized.18 5
This refers to ongoing operation as well as to dissolution of corpora-
tions or associations.
"Mixed" Unincorporated-Corporate Organizations
Cooperatives, and to some extent Professional "Corporations" and
Trusts, incorporated or unincorporated, present a special problem that
181 See, N. Y. NoT-FoR-PROFIT CORP. L., Art. 11 (McKinney 1970).
182 See, text supra, note 157.
183 This technique was first explained in personal conversations between Mr. Clark,
its innovator, and the writer in 1964.
184 N. Y. NOT-FoR-PROFIT CORP. L. est. § 601 (McKinney 1970).
185 Id., under the Ohio statute, if the article or by-laws so provide, corporations, whether
profit or non-profit, or partnerships, may be members of non-profit organizations;
OHIO REV. CODE, § 1702.13 (E) (1955).
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resembles the reverse of the liability-fixing question discussed in
the earlier parts of this paper.
A trust, for example, can be liable as an entity for wrongs done by its
employees. But beneficiaries and/or trustees may be personally liable
for wrongs done by the trust; and such liability depends mainly on
the extent of control of (or, right to control) the trust organization.
This is only obliquely a matter of the law of unincorporated non-
profit associations. In effect, a corporate organization (and, of course,
an unincorporated one) can involve personal liability that closely
resembles that of a partnership. 8 6
Professional corporations (or, associations) of physicians or lawyers,
are corporations almost solely for tax and pension purposes. For most
other purposes they are treated as partnerships (e.g., for ethics or
personal liability purposes),187
Real Estate Cooperatives and Condominiums can involve substantial
risks of personal liability for members, which is proportionate to the
amount of control of (or, right to control) common areas, whether the
formal organization is based on corporate, trust, association, or in-
dividual-title-plus-cross-easement (or undivided interest in common
areas),188 Farm cooperatives usually involve little personal liability
for members, under most state statutory systems. 8 9
Conclusion: Points to Remember in Counsel Work for
Unincorporated Associations
An attorney handling the formation and/or operation of an un-
incorporated nonprofit association should bear in mind the following
guiding principles:
Always use articles of association. Do not rely on oral agree-
ments.
Tailor your articles to your purposes and plans.
Use corporate form, if possible. It is better for all but a few kinds
of organizations.
Check your state laws to see whether or not the association as
such can take title to property. If it cannot, appoint trustees to hold
title for the association.
186 Application of partnership law to an unincorporated partnership; McDonald v.
McDonald, 53 Wis.2d 371, 192 N.W.2d 903 (1972); and see, as to trusts, Annot.,
156 A.L.R. 22-231 (1945); Jones, Business Trusts in Florida-Liability of Share-
holders, 14 FLA. L. REV. 1(1961); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS (4th ed. 1963); A SCOTT,
TRUSTS (3d ed. 1967).
187 B. EATON, Professional Corporations and Associations in BENDER, BusINssS ORGAN-
IZATIONS Vol's. 17, 17A, 17B (current ed.); K. STRONG, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
(1971) ; Note, The Illinois Professional Association Act, 57 N. W. L. REV. 334 (1962).
188 PACKEL, LAW OF COOPERATIVES (4th ed. 1970) ; Comment, Community Apartments,
50 CALIF. L. REV. 299 (1962) ; Note, Condominiums-Member of Unincorporated
Association May Sue Association for Negligent Maintenance of Common Areas, 40
FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (1972).
189 E. Roy, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN AGRICULTURE (1970); White, The Farmer and
His Cooperative, 7 KANS. L. REV. 334 (1959).
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Obey licensing and registration laws.
Check your state laws as to whether the association can sue or
be sued in its own name. If it cannot, designate an officer for this
purpose and protect him with a bond.
Remember that bankruptcy and insolvency laws make special
provisions for nonprofit organizations.
Remember that the law of "principal and agent" governs acts of
association representatives; and beware of "implied" or "apparent"
authority.
Labor unions are subject to special laws. And these laws change
often. Check the latest statutes before you act.
Provide carefully for internal management, meetings, members'
rights, admission, and expulsion.
Provide exact procedures for amendment of the charter, con-
stitution, and bylaws.
Register as a foreign association if you carry on any real activity
in another state.
Provide exact procedures for dissolution votes and for distribu-
tion of property after payment of debts.
Consider the use of unincorporated association form for effec-
tuating the winding-up process in dissolving a non-profit organization.
Consider the use of combinations of incorporated and unincor-
porated operation.
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